

LL SRI Global Equity Fund (CAD)

Q2 2020

Fund Description

The **SRI Global Equity Fund** ('the Fund'), managed by Setanta Asset Management Limited ("Setanta"), is an actively managed equity portfolio which holds c.60-100 global stocks. The portfolio is managed in accordance with the Setanta investment philosophy. In addition to this stocks are screened to ensure they meet predefined ethical criteria. Ethical restrictions exclude investments in a number of areas, including the likes of armaments, embryonic stem cell research, and nuclear fuels.

The Fund is managed by a team of eight global sector specialists, overseen by two lead portfolio managers. The aim is to achieve a sensible level of diversification on a sector and geographic basis. Stocks are chosen through bottom-up analysis, based on investment merit, while adhering to the ethical criteria.

The investment objective of the Fund is to outperform the MSCI World index over periods of three years or more.

Fund Commentary

The Bloomberg headline on the 1st of July pretty much said it all: "S&P 500's Past 100 Days Were Its Best in Almost Nine Decades". That followed the fastest ever 30% decline for the index - 22 days - in February / March.

(Fund Commentary continued on Page 3)

Portfolio Managers

David Coyne & Sean Kenzie CFA



Our Investment Principles

We do not believe markets are efficient

We invest below our estimate of intrinsic value

We invest in businesses rather than buying stocks

Preservation of our clients' capital is key

Investing is a marathon, not a sprint

We are not afraid to swim against the tide


We consider scenarios rather than making forecasts

Businesses we own must have strong balance sheets

We make mistakes and always endeavour to learn from them

We will act with integrity in everything we do

Fund Performance – 30.06.2020 (CAD)



Performance Source: Setanta Asset Management Limited. The Fund returns are based on the movements in the unit prices of the London Life SRI Global Equity Fund (8.96SAM) [IEC15006] and are gross of management fees. The performance will be reduced by the impact of management fees paid, the amount of which varies. **Benchmark:** MSCI World (CAD). **Holdings Source:** Setanta. Sector allocations based on invested portfolio only (excludes cash). **Fund Statistics Source:** Bloomberg.


Top 10 Holdings

COMPANY	SECTOR	% OF FUND
MICROSOFT CORP	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	4.8%
DCC	INDUSTRIALS	3.7%
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY	FINANCIALS	3.5%
LANCASHIRE HOLDINGS	FINANCIALS	3.4%
ORACLE CORP	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	2.9%
KEYSIGHT TECHNOLOGIES	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	2.8%
CISCO SYSTEMS	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	2.7%
ERICSSON	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	2.6%
JOHNSON CONTROLS	INDUSTRIALS	2.5%
NIKE INC	CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY	2.2%


Fund Statistics

PRICE/BOOK	1.6
PRICE/EARNINGS RATIO (FY 1)	17.7
DIVIDEND YIELD %	2.2
AVERAGE MARKET CAP C\$BN	116.3
NO. OF HOLDINGS	72
ACTIVE SHARE %	87.1
DEBT/EQUITY %	62.6

Sector Distribution



Geographic Distribution



Commentary

Due to the damaging effects of COVID-19, the OECD recently forecast the global economy to shrink by between 6% and 7.6% in 2020 (depending on whether or not there is a second wave). It will be the worst peacetime recession since the Great Depression. This is despite unprecedented levels of wage and business subsidies by governments around the world, which unquestionably prevented mass unemployment and bankruptcies. While a recovery is expected in 2021 and beyond, this very much depends on economies being able to reopen, with few COVID-induced hangovers (including weening economies off subsidies). That is far from certain.

Quite remarkably, in our opinion, at a general level investors have largely bought into the recovery story. The MSCI World rose 14.2% in Q2 (CAD terms) and finished the first half of the year down just 1.0% (CAD terms). The Fund lagged this strong performance by 2.1% in Q2 and year-to-end June was behind by 7.3%.

In contrast to the 1.0% first half fall in the MSCI World, which is a market cap-weighted performance of 1,600 stocks, the 'typical' stock in the benchmark fell by around double that rate (the median fell 12.7% and the simple average stock fell 11.3%). In other words, large capitalisation companies materially outperformed. This can be seen in the chart below, which shows the performance difference between the MSCI World cap-weighted and equally-weighted indices (same constituents) by year back to 1999 when the latter index was created. When large cap stocks outperform, the cap-weighted index outperforms the equal-weight one and vice versa. The cap-weighted index has outperformed by a cumulative 14% over the last 30 months, including a 6.7% difference in H1:20. Granted, it's nothing like the outperformance of the equal-weight index between 2000 and 2006 (when small caps outperformed), but that in turn was a reversal of the large cap outperformance in the mid-to-late 1990s. As we pointed out in last quarter's letter, the fund has a significant overweight in small and mid-cap stocks (23% at quarter end versus benchmark of less than 2%). We estimate this has cost the fund almost 4% in relative performance in H1:20. We are not convinced it is because our small and mid-cap stocks are worse effected by COVID-19. Overall we feel it is undeserved and would hope to recoup performance over time when the market better appreciates their potential.



Note: Chart is in Euro terms

The outperformance by large cap companies has not been evenly distributed unfortunately – some stocks have hogged more of the limelight than others. At one end of the spectrum is **Berkshire Hathaway**, the \$440bn diversified financial conglomerate. Berkshire fell 5% in Q2 leaving the share price down 20% for H1, despite a cheap valuation, a collection of generally good-to-excellent assets and a cash rich balance sheet that should be the envy of the world. The share price performance of Berkshire is all the more confusing seeing as Berkshire owns nearly 6% of Apple (+25% in H1) and which now accounts for over 20% of Berkshire's market cap.

Commentary

At the other end of the spectrum, there are many high quality companies that we follow but don't own, some of which are currently trading at extremely high valuations (over fifty times earnings). Their valuation premium over the rest of the market has widened again this year, perhaps the result of their near-term earnings certainty combined with ultra-low interest rates. You should not expect us to buy these stocks at these valuations.

If the valuation of some high quality growth names is raising an eyebrow, other areas of the market are truly eye popping. Stocks that are favourites with day traders have in some cases risen by hundreds of percent this year. Nikola Corp (electric trucks) is a good example of this. Its charismatic CEO promises a great future and its share price rose by 550% in the first half of the year, reaching a market cap of \$28bn at one point – not bad for a company currently with no revenues. Pinduoduo (ecommerce platform, \$100bn market cap, +130% year-to-date), Shopify (ecommerce platform, \$115bn cap, +150% ytd), Moderna (biotech, \$23bn cap, +200% ytd), Tesla (electric cars, \$250bn cap, +200% ytd) and Beyond Meat (plant-based foods, \$9bn cap, +90% ytd) are in the same category: loss-making, promising high growth and highly speculative valuations. Of course, some of this crop might one day produce business performances to justify their current valuations, just as Amazon has been a spectacular winner from the 'class of 1999'. However it looks probable that collectively the 'class of 2020' will fail to produce good investment returns. The fund is and will remain underweight these types of companies.

This is without question the toughest 18 month period that our Global Equity Fund has faced in its 20-year plus history. In recent fund reports we have highlighted poor performers, such as **Saga**, **O-I Glass**, **DXC** and **Origin**. While these have certainly detracted from overall fund performance, we have also had outsized winners, such as **Steris**, **Keysight**, **Lowe's** and **Sandstorm Gold**. A balanced assessment suggests the net effect of these positives and negatives accounts for a minority of underperformance, with the net contribution of the top and bottom 5 stocks accounting for circa -2% year-to-date (overall fund underperformance -8%). The rest we believe to be related to the market environment.

The twin challenges for us are the market's narrow focus on large, expensive high quality growth as well as speculative growth companies, cohorts that are winning investor votes over 'value' (including small and mid-cap) stocks. If this environment continues the fund could continue to underperform; were this to happen the valuation spread between growth and value, already the widest it has ever been, would continue to widen. Our investment philosophy centres on identifying quality businesses but crucially being price-conscious, risk averse and long-term orientated – the tenets of our long-held investment approach. We believe our clients will ultimately be rewarded for this discipline.

Portfolio Activity

During the quarter the Fund purchased one new stock and sold three.

The new stock was **SEI Investments**, a US financial services company. SEI offers clients in asset and wealth management a range of technology and services, from full or partial outsourcing of investment functions, to consulting services, to sponsoring a range of 'manager of manager' funds. SEI is often embedded in its clients' processes, making them a critical and long-term partner. It explains why more than 90% of revenues are recurring and why the company has made healthy profits year in, year out since the 1980s. SEI has spent much of the last decade revamping its technology platforms and services, a massive undertaking that is now behind it, and as new clients are signed it should help to restore margins in its largest but least profitable Private Banks division. Historic growth in revenues and profits has been in the 5-6% range, which we expect to be matched or perhaps beaten over time.

Commentary

A particular feature of SEI is a net cash position of \$850m, 10% of its market cap. This is especially reassuring when its investment needs going forward are less and, judging by history, the company is unlikely to make acquisitions of note. We expect the company to continue to make material share repurchases. At the time of purchase SEI traded on a P/E of less than 20x. We consider this attractive given the high quality nature of the company, both on an absolute basis and especially compared to companies of similar quality in other parts of the market.

We funded SEI through a sale of **Fairfax Financial**, a Canadian headquartered insurance company with global operations. Fairfax was purchased in 2011 and while money was made on the investment, the opportunity cost versus the benchmark was large. The bottom line is that Fairfax has struggled to make consistent, attractive returns. Insurance companies perform two roles: to underwrite and price policies in a prudent manner, and to invest the 'float' that arises from customers paying upfront. While Fairfax produced a solid margin on the insurance side, its investment returns have been woeful. Over the 9 years it was owned in the fund, Fairfax produced a return on equity of around 6%. With low confidence in management and their ability to improve returns, we preferred the long-term risk-reward trade-off for SEI.

We sold out of **Covetrus**, a US animal health services company. We received shares in this company in February 2019 in a spin-out from Henry Schein, the market leading distributor of products and services to office-based healthcare professionals. Just prior to the spin, Covetrus merged with a company called Vets First and while we expected some teething problems, the company significantly undershot its own performance projections. Management did not impress on the conference calls and investors questioned the merits of the merger, leading to a collapse in the share price (-85% from spin to March 2020). Following a partial recovery of the shares we fully sold out our holding. Luckily Covetrus was always a tiny position in the fund (0.25% at its highest), so the impact on performance was small. However this debacle caused us to lose a fair degree of confidence in the judgement and motivations of the Henry Schein senior management team, who arranged and wholeheartedly backed this merger and spin. To say that these judgements now look poor would probably be an understatement. Indeed it led us to reduce our position in Henry Schein in the Fund towards the back end of 2019.

David Coyne

Co-Lead Global Equity Fund

Contact Details:

Suite S8-02,
Eight Floor,
190 Simcoe Street,
Toronto,
Ontario,
M5T 2W5

Rocco Vessio, (T) 416-552-5061 , (M) 647-823-4813

[E-mail: rocco.vessio@setanta-asset.com](mailto:rocco.vessio@setanta-asset.com)

www.setanta-asset.com

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

The SRI Global Equity Fund is managed by Setanta Asset Management Limited and is a representative account of the SRI Global Equity strategy. The performance shown is the performance of a representative account (London Life SRI Global Equity Fund 8.96SAM [IEC15006]). The strategy is available on a separate account basis to institutional investors however current and prospective clients should not assume identical performance results to those shown would have been achieved for their account if it was invested in the strategy during the period. Clients of the firm may receive different performance than the representative account. Client performance may differ due to factors such as timing of investment(s), timing of withdrawal(s), client-mandated investment restrictions and the portfolio not being fully replicated for new accounts or new flows. Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses carefully before investing. See 'WARNING' and IMPORTANT INFORMATION' sections below.

Setanta Asset Management Limited is regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland, New Wapping Street, North Wall Quay, Dublin 1, Ireland. This factsheet, which is for information purposes only, does not form part of any contract. This is a marketing communication that (a) has not been prepared in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research, and (b) is not subject to any prohibition on dealing ahead of the dissemination investment research. The information contained in this document is based on current legislation and is, therefore subject to change. The contents are intended as a guideline only and should not be construed as an interpretation of the law. You should always seek the advice of an appropriately qualified professional. Performance disclosures are stated above.

The MSCI information may only be used for your internal use, may not be reproduced or re-disseminated in any form and may not be used as a basis for or a component of any financial instruments or products or indices. None of the MSCI information is intended to constitute investment advice or a recommendation to make (or refrain from making) any kind of investment decision and may not be relied on as such. Historical data and analysis should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of any future performance analysis, forecast or prediction. The MSCI information is provided on an "as is" basis and the user of this information assumes the entire risk of any use made of this information. MSCI, each of its affiliates and each other person involved in or related to compiling, computing or creating any MSCI information (collectively, the "MSCI Parties") expressly disclaims all warranties (including, without limitation, any warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, timeliness, non-infringement, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose) with respect to this information. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall any MSCI Party have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, incidental, punitive, consequential (including, without limitation, lost profits) or any other damages

WARNING: Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well as up and investors may not get back the amount invested. The return may increase or decrease as a result of currency fluctuations. Forecasts are not a reliable indicator of future performance